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PROCESSING CIVILIAN COMPLAINTS:
A STUDY OF THE MILWAUKEE FIRE
AND POLICE COMMISSION
RiCHARD S. JONEiS*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Today our world is brimming with increased racial tensions and negative police-community encounters. This comes in the aftermath of highly
publicized cases of police abuse and public questions concerning the extent of police authority and discretion. These questions have led to a
renewed interest in civilian review boards. Cities throughout the nation
are becoming increasingly sensitive to the public's need for trust in the
police. A recent example of change is in New York City, where the police review process was upgraded to provide more power to civilians.
Civilian review involves the creation of an independent body, outside
the police department, to review instances of alleged police misconduct.'
In theory, civilian review boards function as appellate courts. The defining characteristic of civilian review is the review of police misconduct by
persons who are not sworn police officers.2 Citizens who feel they are
victims of police misconduct and are not satisfied with the way the police
department handled their complaint can bring their case before a civilian
review board. Although citizen review varies among jurisdictions, its
purposes may include bringing police abuse and corruption out in the
open, recommending or imposing sanctions on deviant police officers,
and recommending or implementing changes in police policies and procedures.3 Currently, boards authorized to review citizen complaints
against the police exist in approximately sixty percent of the major cities
in the United States.4
From the moment of their inception, review boards have met with
only moderate success. Some failures have been the result of a lack of
sufficient power to sanction police officers who are guilty of abuse or to
* Assistant Professor of Sociology at Marquette University; B.S. 1979 and M.S. 1984,
Mankato State University; Ph.D. 1986, Iowa State.
1. GEOFFREY P. ALPERT & ROGER G. DUNHAM, POLICING URBAN AMERICA 116 (2d ed.

1992).
2. SAMUEL WALKER & Vic W. BUMPHUS, CIVILIAN REVIEW OF THE POLICE: A NATIONAL SURVEY OF THE 50 LARGESr CIms 1 (1991).

3. ALPERT & DUNHAM, supra note 1, at 116-17.
4. WALKER & BUMPHUS, supra note 2, at 1.
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influence the policy making process.' In addition, review boards have
routinely faced opposition from the police departments that they are created to oversee. 6 This Article examines the role of review boards in contemporary American society, giving special attention to the Milwaukee
model.
II.

DATA AND

METHODS

Fieldwork for this study was conducted at the Milwaukee Fire and
Police Commission (MFPC), Milwaukee, Wisconsin, from 1992 to 1993.
The research focused on the way in which citizen complaints against the
police were processed by the MFPC. Data for this Article consists of
interviews of MFPC staff members and observations of citizen complaint
hearings before the MFPC. Further information was gained through
documents and resource material provided by the MFPC. The data were
analyzed to present a profile of the historical development and current
structure and operation of the MFPC.
III.

THE CREATION OF CIVILIAN OVERSIGrH

Interest in the formation of civilian review boards is of relatively recent origin. During the turbulent 1960s, "[a]s abuses of police power
became painfully evident during [the] televised coverage of anti-Vietnam
War as well as civil rights protests, many cities established civilian complaints tribunals."7 Interest in civilian review boards was short lived, primarily because of the political clout of the law enforcement community.
As a result, many of the civilian review boards were dismantled.8
In the 1980s, new mechanisms for receiving and investigating complaints against the police were brought about by routine rather than
through the confrontational politics of the 1960s. 9 The primary impetus
behind the more recent introduction of civilian review boards was a shift
in philosophy toward more community-oriented policing.' ° This renewed interest in civilian oversight by local governments resulted in review boards with a broader focus." The spread of civilian review
5. ALPERT & DUNHAM, supra note 1, at 116-17.
6. 1l
7. David H. Bayley, Preface to COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE POLICE: THE TREND TO ExTERNAL REVIEW at v (Andrew J. Goldsmith ed., 1991) [hereinafter ComrLAmINrs AGAINST
THE POLICE].

8.
9.
10.
11.

Id.at v-vi.
Id.at vi.
Id. at vii.
ALPERT & DUNHAM, supra note 1, at 118.
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represents a new national consensus on civilian oversight as an appropriate way of handling citizen complaints about police misconduct.
Although the police continue to bitterly resent any form of civilian oversight, the hostility directed toward civilian review is less than that en12
countered in the 1960s.
Recent research on police accountability has generally accepted and
operated on the following assumptions:
First, police cannot be trusted to police themselves....
Second, civilian review is critical to the legitimacy of the
police....
Third, the complaints-handling process must be separated into
different categories of problems and solutions.... [Fourth], complaints should also be examined to determine recurrent problems
in police operations that might lead to changes in policy....
[And finally], police resistance to civilian oversight is more
emotional than reasoned.' 3
IV.

EXTERNAL VERSUS INTERNAL REVIEW

The recent participation of civilians in the complaint procedure reflects a move away from earlier approaches to citizens' complaints. In
earlier approaches, the police assumed total responsibility for the receipt, investigation, and determination of all complaints; "these approaches were adjuncts of the internal police disciplinary system." 4 The
emergence of external forms of review arose out of long-standing failure
by police to respond adequately to citizen complaints.' 5
Traditionally, review boards have been identified as having an inter6
nal or external method of handling complaints against the police.'
Some boards have internal investigations of complaints conducted within
the police department offices and ranks. Other boards have external or
independent investigations in which the complaints are investigated by
personnel outside the police department. However, some surveys:
reject the commonly used distinction between "internal" and "external" review procedures. [They found that] some of the existing
procedures (i.e., Chicago and Detroit) are "internal" in the sense
that the staff are employees of the police department.... Because
12. Bayley, supra note 7, at vii.
13. Id. at ix-x.
14. Andrew J. Goldsmith, Introduction to CoMPLAirNs AGAINST THE POLICE, supra note
7, at 5.
15. Id. at 6.
16. WALKER & BumHus, supra note 2, at 2-3.
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the staff members are not sworn officers, however, these procedures provide an independent review of complaints. [Alternatively], the Kansas City Office of Civilian Complaints is
"external" to the police department, with a civilian director, but
complaints are investigated by sworn officers. Although nominally "external," it does not have involvement of nonsworn personnel at the critical fact-finding stage.' 7
V.

CoMPOsrrION AND PROCEDURE OF THE BOARDS

Civilian review procedures vary greatly across the United States.
Bumphus and Walker's national survey classifies civilian review boards
according to who does the initial investigation of a citizen complaint,
who reviews the investigative report, and whether the boards have the
authority to apply sanctions or make recommendations for action.' 8
Bumphus and Walker found that 40% of the civilian review agencies
in their study were Class I, where the initial investigation, fact finding,
review of the investigative report, and recommendation for action were
done by nonsworn personnel or a board consisting of a majority of nonsworn persons. 19 In addition, 47% of the agencies were Class II, where
the investigation and fact finding were conducted by sworn police officers, but the review and recommendations for action were made by
nonsworn personnel or a board consisting of a majority of nonsworn persons.20 Finally, 13% of the agencies were Class III, with the investigation, fact finding, and recommendation made by sworn officers, but the
opportunity existed for the citizen who was dissatisfied with the final
disposition of the complaint to appeal to a board that included nonsworn
persons. 2 '
Other important findings from the Bumphus and Walker study are
that most of the existing civilian review procedures have been established by local ordinance (77%), while others were created by state statute (10%) or executive order ( 13 %).22 Notably, only 1 of the 30 review
agencies in their sample had the power to impose sanctions on police
officers. The remaining agencies had only "the power to make recom17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
WALKER & BUMPHUS, supra note 2, at 2-3.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.

1994] STUDY OF MILWAUKEE FIRE AND POLICE COMMISSION 509

mendations for
disciplinary action to the police chief or police
' 2' 3
commission.
Civilian review or oversight boards are usually composed of a representative cross section of the community independent of the police department.2 4 One of the major problems contemporary police encounter
is the isolation of police officers from the community. Civilian review
boards, with members representing all segments of the community,
could help to break down that isolation.25 Review board members are
generally selected by the mayor or city council. Minority communities
often criticize this appointment method as another way they can be assured that no action will be taken against the police.26 Many patrol officers and police administrators have also complained that politicians are
attempting to control police behavior through the appointment
process. 27
The typical complaint procedure is one in which complaints are accepted by mail, by phone, or in person, at the precinct stations or headquarters, thereby reducing the likelihood that prospective complainants
will be deterred by inconvenience or fear.28 A citizen might be afraid to
complain at his or her local precinct if it is the same precinct where the
officer accused of wrongdoing is assigned.29 The inconvenience of going
to headquarters might also discourage some citizens from complaining,
although civil liberty organizations may file grievances on behalf of a
complainant.30 Many citizens do not air grievances because of timidness,
or because they feel an inability to properly express their problem.
Many citizens may lack the time to deal with their complaint, may be
unaware of police procedures, or may feel that the police cannot effectively investigate fellow police officers. Harold Beral, Marcus Sisk,3 and
23. Id. The Walker & Bumphus study reported that none of the review agencies in their
sample had the power to impose sanctions on police officers. This is an error because MFPC
has this authority and was a part of this study. Letter from Joan Dimow, Senior Research
Assistant, Fire and Police Commission, City of Milwaukee, to Richard S. Jones, Department
of Social and Cultural Sciences, Marquette University (Sept. 24, 1993) (on file with author).
24. ALPERT & DUNHAM, supra note 1, at 117.
25. SAMUEL WALKER, Tiim POLICE IN AMERICA: AN INTRODUCTION 240 (1983).
26. ALPERT & DUNHAM, supra note 1, at 117.
27. Id.
28. Harold Beral & Marcus Sisk, The Administration of Complaints by Civilians Against
the Police, 77 HARV. L. REv. 499, 501 (1964).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See iU at 501-02.
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Herman Goldstein 32 found allegations against police departments that
included discouraging citizen complaints by: (1) acting hostile when the
complainant fied a charge, (2) showing a lack of objectivity in the investigation of the complaint, (3) failing to provide formal adversary hearings, and (4) being unwilling to impose meaningful discipline on officers
found guilty of misconduct. 33 This is in spite of the fact that "[c]itizen
involvement in the police complaint process is suggested as an alternative to monitor the procedure and to assure some amount of fundamen34
tal fairness.
Some officers and even some citizens may feel that complaints are in
some way pathological or abnormal, and the ideal system would not allow for the generation of any complaints.35 This assumption may lead
agencies to respond in too harsh a manner and deal with complaints as
isolated, individualized problems. Complaints are inevitable and should
not be seen simply as threats to existing policies, procedures, or individual officers, but rather as a means for the re-examination of organizational policies and practices.36 However negative a citizen complaint
may be initially, it is a way in which citizens can have their say about
governmental service and can participate in the democratic political process. With a positive police philosophy regarding complaints, the situation between the police and the citizen can often be turned into
something positive for both police service and community relations. Experience has shown that some complainants have become staunch allies
of the police and valuable contributors to worthwhile programs and
projects.37
VI.

POLICE OPPOsrrION TO THE BOARDS

During the past twenty years, the police have voiced strong opposition to the use of civilians in the complaint process, offering a number of
arguments to support their position.38 First, due to the nature of their
job, police are very likely to have a number of false accusations brought
32. See Herman Goldstein, Administrative Problems in Controllingthe Exercise of Police
Authority, 58 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE ScI. 160, 162-64 (1967).
33. Richard J. Terrill, Complaint Procedures:Variations on the Theme of Civilian Participation, 10 J. POLICE SCL & ADMIN. 398, 399 (1982).
34. Id.
35. Andrew J.Goldsmith, ExternalReview and Self Regulation: PoliceAccountability and
the Dialectic of Complaint Procedure,in CoMiLAINmrs AGAINST THE POLICE, supra note 7, at
18.
36. Id. at 18-19.
37. Louis A. RADELET,THE POLICE AND THE COMMUNITY 359-60 (2d prtg. 1974).
38. Terrill, supra note 33, at 399.
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against them, especially by those that have been arrested or those who
have been given a citation.3 9 However, the citizens reviewing the alleged
misconduct would be capable of weighing and determining the truth of
the citizens' statements, much like the citizens sitting on a jury deciding
credibility of witnesses and the outcome of cases.
Second, police have often said that given the variety of tasks they are
expected to perform and the stressful circumstances under which they
must perform these tasks, mistakes are bound to occur.4" Although this
may be true, it does not justify self policing. Attempts are being made to
alleviate mistakes through rigorous recruitment campaigns, improved
basic training, and continuing education programs. 41
Third, police often believe that citizen review boards are not essential
because citizens who have a grievance can always turn to criminal law or
can seek judgment through civil claims. 42 However, in reality, the availability of this type of recourse is very limited to citizens, and is frequently
very slow:
[Complainants are often unwilling [or unable] to initiate a suit
because of a lack of personal funds;... there is [usually] a scarcity
of witnesses for corroborating complainants' statements; ...[the]
plaintiffs are unlikely to receive a sizeable recovery for damages;
...[many] local prosecutors are unwilling to prosecute because
they rely upon a positive working relationship with the police departments;... [and many] judges and juries are more apt to believe the officer than the complainant, who is frequently poor, has
an unusual lifestyle, or has a criminal record. 43
Beyond that, by suggesting that citizens turn to the courts, the police
44
insinuate that most complainants want to sue or prosecute the police.
The police are missing the point, however, by not recognizing that most
citizen complainants are merely unhappy with the conduct of the officer
and would be satisfied with an explanation or an apology.
Finally, police believe that "[rieview boards are composed of citizens
whose fields of employment and interest are unrelated to law enforcement." 45 However, most review boards are comprised of very well qualified people. Further, every citizen has a vested interest in the way the
39. Id.
40. IdU

41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 400.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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police departments are structured and run. Finally, review boards
should be representative of the community as a whole, and if the process
of selection becomes too narrow, this goal may never be reached.
Historically, rank-and-file officers have been opposed to civilian review boards. 46 These officers believe that, until civilians walk in an officer's shoes, civilians cannot accurately judge police behavior.47 Despite
this, police administrations have begun to recognize that civilian participation in the complaints process is essential to their new strategic vision
of a partnership with the community. Police departments are talking
about developing a new kind of professionalism that involves paying attention to community opinion, rather than just relying on political directives.4" The new professionalism, unlike the old, stresses the connection
with communities and civilian feedback rather than autonomy, isolation,
and contempt for lay opinion.49 Police are realizing that participating in
the creation of civilian review boards is better than having them
"crammed down their throats."'5 0 Boards are viewed as vehicles for
making the police more democratic and for maintaining a process of civilian monitoring of the police.5 '
VII.

MILWAUKEE

FIRE

AND POLICE COMMISSION:

AN EMERGING MODEL

The Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission was established in 1885
with the passage of Chapter 378 of the Wisconsin Laws of 1885.52
It is the oldest established fire and police commission in the
United States. The board consists of five members who are appointed by the Mayor to overlapping five year terms, all appointments being subject to Common Council approval.... The Board
employs a twelve member support staff to conduct its day-to-day
business. 3
46. Bayley, supra note 7, at vii.
47. Interview with Michael Morgan, Executive Director, Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission, in Milwaukee, Wis. (July 21, 1992).
48. Bayley, supra note 7, at viii. "Consumer satisfaction is being discussed as an appropriate goal of policing." Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. ALPERT & DUNHAM, supra note 1, at 117.
52. MILWAUKEE FIRE AND POLICE COMM'N COMMEMORATIVE BOOKLET 5 (1985) [hereinafter COMMEMORATIVE BOOKLET].
53. 1990 MILWAUKEE FIRE AND POLICE COMM'N ANN. REP. 1.
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Legal responsibilities of the MFPC are set forth in the Milwaukee
city Charter 4 and in the Wisconsin State Statutes.55 This civilian board
has a variety of functions, including setting employment standards, testing, appointing the chiefs, holding sole authority for removing chiefs
from office, and holding final authority (upon appeal) for dismissal of
any member. 56 In addition, the M1FPC is "empowered to hear appeals
from departmental discipline and conduct citizen complaints hearings."5 "
The commission "has original rule making authority for both the Fire
and Police Departments, which it has delegated to the respective
chiefs."5 8
"The major impetus for the creation of the Board [in 1885] was to
stop the mayoral practice of firing police and fire chiefs at will." 5 9 Ini-

tially, the MFPC was made up of four unpaid commissioners who "appeared at disciplinary hearings and citizen complaint hearings held by
the respective departments in an oversight capacity. ' 60 In 1911, passage
of Chapter 586 expanded the commission to a five-member board. The
commission was empowered to hear the complaints of property owners
against any member of either department, and to hear appeals of disciplinary action from any member of either department discharged, suspended, or reduced in rank by the chiefs of the departments.6 ' On
August 5, 1911, the board received its first citizen complaint, which was
62
directed at the chief of the fire department.
"In 1969 and again in 1977, state legislation revised the Commission's
complaint law by broadening the scope of those who could file complaints against fire and police personnel, from property owners only
(Laws of 1911) to electors (1969) to any aggrieved person (1977). " 63 Fi-

nally, with passage of Senate Bill 56 in 1984, the MFPC "acquired the
authority to prescribe general policies and standards for police and fire
departments ... [and] to review the efficiency and general good conduct

of the departments." 64 This Article focuses solely on the process of citi54. MILWAUKEE, WIS., ORDINANCES
55. Wis. STAT. § 62.50 (1991-92).

56.

ch. 22 (1993).

1990 MILWAUKEE FIRE AND POLICE COMM'N ANN. REP. 1

57. Id.
58. Id. at 2.
59. COMmEMORATIW

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 7.
Id. at 8.

IdId. at 11-12.
Id. at 12.

BOOKLET,

supra note 53, at 6.
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zen complaints against the police, although the process is similar to complaints against the fire department.
The citizen complaint procedure in Milwaukee is different from that
of any other city. Milwaukee's board offers citizens a completely independent process that does not rely on the police department for any
function. The citizen complaint procedure allows individuals to charge
members of the Milwaukee Police Department and Milwaukee Fire Department with misconduct. The MFPC can suspend, demote, or discharge department members for conduct in violation of department
rules and regulations. This process is described by a staff member of
MFPC as follows:
The board has the authority to suspend, anywhere from one to
sixty days, without pay. Or demote, if someone's a sergeant we
could bust them down to a patrol officer. Or to discharge. We
looked into the possibility of having the option of ordering an
officer to participate in educational programs or counseling, or
public service programs that might be more beneficial than suspensions or demotions, but that option doesn't exist under the
current statute.65
If a citizen believes that a member of the Milwaukee Police or Fire
Department has engaged in misconduct, that citizen may file a written
complaint either with the respective department or with the commission.
Citizens may file in person or have a complaint form mailed to them.
The complainants may have a lawyer handle their complaint or may
complete the complaint procedure on their own. However, the commission does not provide or pay for citizens' legal assistance.
The MFPC's Committee on Rules and Complaints determines
whether the board has the authority to hear the case. If the behavior
described does not violate a department policy, then the commission has
no authority. The commission can decide that a complaint should be
dismissed because it is outside its authority, that the complaint should be
referred to the chief of the fire or police department for investigation, or
that the complaint should be referred for conciliation, which is a one-onone meeting with the citizen and the accused officer. An MFPC staff
member explains:
[In] conciliation,

...

the person [who] is complaining comes in,

the.., police officer comes in, they sit down at a table... usually
there [is a] ... mediator to keep things moving. They can have a
65. Interview with Joan Dimow, Senior Research Analyst, Milwaukee Fire and Police
Commission, in Milwaukee, Wis. (June 29, 1992).
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lawyer there, although the lawyers aren't allowed to participate
....[T]he idea is that they should try and talk it out and see if
they can come to an agreement before it gets to a formal hearing
and trial.66
Many times the complaint is resolved at the point of conciliation because citizens only need an explanation of the policies, or an apology
from the accused officer for their grievance to be satisfied. 67
Over 50% of
the cases that reach conciliation are resolved at this point.
Sometimes,... the best way to get a conciliation is for everybody
else to leave the room and leave the two people.... [A common
complaint] is verbal abuse of some sort. "They swore at me."
"They called me a bitch." "They called me a nigger." Things like
that. And those are the sort of things that many will accept an
apology from the person who did it, and say, "fine, that's what I
wanted, please don't do it to anybody else."68
If no agreement is reached, a pretrial conference is set to narrow the
issues and to set a date for trial. A trial is conducted by a panel of commissioners or by a hearing examiner. The citizen is responsible for meeting the same burden of proof as in a criminal trial: beyond a reasonable
doubt. The trial is described as follows:
Basically the way a trial works is the person who is complaining
presents their case [sic]. They can present any witnesses they may
have, the officer presents his or her case and any witnesses....
[T]he biggest problem there is that very few complainants have
any real evidence to offer. And most of the time it comes to "he
says, she says." The complainant says A, and the officer says B.
And the board has to decide who to believe. Now, under the
American legal system someone is innocent until they are proven
guilty. And if there is no proof... what that means is that it's
fairly rare for things to come to trial to [sic] end up in a guilty
verdict against the officer. Just because most of the time there's
no clear evidence .... You know, very few people... I mean
that's probably what would have happened to Rodney King 69
if
that guy hadn't been out on his balcony with his video camera.
Prior to the trial or any type of conciliation, citizens are completely
responsible for conducting their own investigations. This process is very
different from other cities, which often rely on the police department for
initial investigations. The process is described as follows:
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Now, the commission itself can't provide any sort of active help to
people. And we also can't provide any sort of active help to the
police officers. Everything you have to understand is that when
somebody files a citizen complaint they can't get anything out of
it. They cannot get any sort of monetary judgement or anything.
The most they are going to get is the satisfaction of seeing the
officer punished. And partly because of that, and partly
because
70
it is a legalistic procedure, we lose a lot of people.
VIII.

STRENGTHS OF THE MILWAUKEE MODEL

Within the past two years, Milwaukee's Fire and Police Commission
has tried to streamline the citizen complaint process. It has succeeded in
paring the process down and making it more accessible to citizens. The
commission has also attempted to facilitate increased awareness of the
board and the citizen complaint process by creating a pamphlet to be
circulated throughout the community. This pamphlet outlines the procedures and fosters awareness of the complaint process to those who
otherwise may never know about it. An MFPC staff member explains:
In the past ....

[citizens] pretty much had to do it themselves.

One of the reasons for this booklet is because we have been
working with a number of community organizations, because [in]
our case and in other cities there's also the problem that many
[people] are very uncomfortable about coming to police headquarters. And what we've got now is a half a dozen [community]
organizations . .

which will be helping people to fill out

complaints.7 '
The commission's interest in community-oriented policing is demonstrated in its efforts to hire police officers who will adapt to this
philosophy.
[M]ost of the things... [talked] about in terms of hiring... police
officers, looking at how the police department functions, [concern] basic attitudes that are ingrained in police officers.... [A]U
of [those] things ultimately are a factor in citizen complaints....
If we hire people who are extremely authoritarian, who just want
to tell people what to do, you can guarantee that there will be lots
of citizen complaints.72
Other cities are handicapped in their ability to make a real difference
in one of two ways. Either they only have the ability to advise or make
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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recommendations to the police chief, or they only have the ability to
review the procedure or outcome of a citizen complaint. The primary
strength of the MFPC, as compared to other cities, is that the MFPC has
the authority to impose sanctions and change policies. The inability to
decide cases and impose punishment has been cited as one of the biggest
reasons for the failure of many civilian review boards. 73 As expressed by
the former Executive Director of the MFPC, "I think that the biggest
strength is that we have teeth in our law." 74 The MFPC has the ability to
discipline, promote, prevent promotions, and order the chief to do what
the board feels is appropriate. Finally, it has the ultimate authority to
move the chief aside and actually operate the police department,75
"whereas other police and fire commissions actually have very little auand push and plead for police
thority to do anything except to chide
76
departments to do the right thing.5

In summary, the MFPC is an exemplary model for a number of reasons. First, it has reduced many of the barriers that have discouraged
citizens from registering complaints against the police. The MFPC is
currently working with community organizations to increase public
awareness of the activities of the commission and also to help citizens in
the filing of complaints. Second, they have streamlined the complaints
process in order to make it more accessible to citizens. Finally, in comparison with other cities, the MFPC is alone in having the authority to
decide cases and impose discipline. In all other cities, the power to decide cases and impose discipline is handled within the police department,
which may raise questions of credibility in the eyes of citizens.
IX.

WEAKNESSES OF THE MILWAUKEE MODEL

There are two major obstacles for citizens who bring complaints
against the police. First, Milwaukee engages in the practice of a Class I
investigation process, which eliminates any sworn personnel from the investigation. As a result, the citizen with no training in investigative work
is at a disadvantage in this process. The police officer has been trained
in investigative practices, has more resources available for the collection
of evidence, and has the additional aid of legal assistance.
A second obstacle is the unequal balance of power that occurs when
a citizen complaint progresses to the trial stage. The accused officers
73. ALPERT & DUNHAM, supra note 1, at 117-18.
74. Interview with Michael Morgan, supra note 47.
75. Id.
76. Id.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:505

have the support of their union; therefore they always have legal representation. The citizen, on the other hand, most often does not have the
resources to attain legal assistance. The citizen's disadvantage in comparison with the officer in question is expressed in the following
statement:
[A]II along the way the police have something that a lot of citizens
don't have, and that is they have lawyers representing them,...
and I think that is probably the most unkind cut of them all. In
most cases, even the most sophisticated citizen is going to find it
very difficult indeed to out maneuver a person who is trained to
maneuver, and to use the law in a way that will benefit his or her
client.77
Currently, the MFPC is trying to address this problem by compiling a
list of lawyers that would be available on a pro bono basis and attempting to organize a clinical program for third-year law students at Marquette University Law School. 78 Both plans demonstrate that the
commission is responsive to the needs of the citizens and is willing to
develop programs to assist citizens and improve the complaint process.
It should be pointed out that there are limits to what the MFPC can
do to assist citizens in the complaint process. First, the MFPC is not, and
cannot be, an advocate for citizens. Since complaints against the police
may reach the conciliation or hearing stage, the MFPC must remain impartial in all of its activities relating to specific cases. Second, even if
citizens are provided legal assistance on a pro bono basis, police officers
will always be at an advantage because they are trained in the collection
of evidence, whereas citizens are not. In addition, police officers will be
represented by attorneys provided by the union who may have considerable experience with citizen complaint cases. Finally, in most cases that
go to trial before the commission, the case centers on the word of the
officer against the word of the citizen. Eyewitnesses are rarely available
to support a citizen's claims. As in any trial, the defendant is innocent
until proven guilty, and that is very difficult to attain in most citizen complaint cases.
X.

CONCLUSION

In any urban society, the need for police is an important one. Most
people recognize that the job of a police officer is a difficult one, full of
stress and the underlying knowledge of the possibility of personal harm.
77. Interview with Michael Morgan, supra note 47.
78. Id.
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Most people also know that police must have authority. But there are
limits to that authority and police must be held accountable for actions
that go beyond the call of duty. Although parameters of accountability
may be questioned, the police are accountable for the services that they
render. They are accountable to the law and to the community.
Cities throughout the nation are becoming increasingly sensitive to
the public's need for trust in the police. Civilian review boards are one
of the most important and proactive ways to foster a continuing relationship between the two groups. From this perspective, cities engaging in
civilian review need to invest more energy in making the complaint process more accessible to the citizens that they serve. Cities that do not
have such procedures should realize the potential civilian review holds
for their communities.
Though the civilian complaint procedure in Milwaukee is far from
ideal, it is still an exemplary model to act as a guide in the creation of
other boards. The strength of the Milwaukee model lies in the authority
that the MFPC has in disciplining wayward police officers and in developing and instituting policy. Its current efforts to reduce the imbalance
of power between citizens and the police in the investigation and hearing
processes clearly make the MFPC one of the premier civilian review
boards in the United States. Other cities throughout the country should
look to the Milwaukee model when considering the creation of new citizen complaints processes or the modification of existing ones.
Citizens are increasingly insisting that police be held accountable for
their actions. Communities are willing to reach out in a more community-oriented model of participation with the police and the administrations governing them in an attempt to strengthen the police-community
relationship. Review boards need to be supported and continually updated. Citizens seeking justice and police departments seeking professional accountability hold joint responsibility for maintaining these
boards and developing them into effective mechanisms for helping and
serving all of those involved.

